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Evaluating the performance of our current farm programs initially requires a specification of policy
goals.  In performing this exercise, we conclude that the goals have changed, much like the policies
have changed.  We then evaluate whether the current set of policies will fulfill the goals in a politically
acceptable manner.  It is concluded that this is questionable, at least in the short run.  Moreover, it is
concluded that, regardless of what is done in policy terms, the farm structure will continue to undergo
dramatic change.  Policies will affect the rate of change in structure, but not the direction which will
continue toward fewer but larger integrated farms.
Goals of Farm Policy
In preparing this paper, we interviewed key committee staff for the House and Senate Agriculture
Committees.  In one case, a leading congressperson was involved in a portion of the interview.  In all
instances, the staff interviewed were in leadership positions during the development of the 1996 Farm
Bill (FAIR), although not necessarily in the same position as they currently occupy.  Those interviewed
were supplied the questions to be discussed three days in advance.1
Future Policy Goals
Each of the respondents was asked, “What are the top goals that you associate with U.S. farm
policy over the next five years?”  The number of goals was limited to five per respondent so as to2
provide a relatively uniform weighting across those interviewed.  The following 17 goals were identified
by the Congressional leaders: 
Frequency Stated Goal
4 Expand markets.
3 Facilitate risk management.
2 Foster market-oriented production.
2 Conserve natural resources.
2 Maintain safe food supply.
2 Increase farm income.
1 Maintain secure food supply.
1 Provide equitable treatment across commodities.
  
It is important to note that the question has a five-year time frame which could have de-
emphasized the effects of the current “farm crisis” on the ranking of policy goals.  It is also possible that
the “expanding markets” goal was viewed primarily as a means for raising prices and incomes, which
was explicitly mentioned in one instance.  Yet, it is also important to note that fostering market-oriented
production was indicated twice as a policy goal which, arguably, is consistent with expanded trade as
well as with less government involvement.
Facilitating risk management was indicated by three of the policy leaders interviewed.  This
response was unambiguously stated and was not in the context of improving crop insurance–a primary
congressional concern at the time of the interview.  This suggested a broader policy perspective on risk
management than just crop insurance.  3
Collins, in providing his perspective on post-2002 farm policy, divides policy goals into economic
and social goals as follows:
Economic Goals Social Goals
# Improve risk management decisions. # Preserve farm numbers.
# Deal with anti-competitive practices. # Help small farms.
# Deal with environmental problems. # Helping socially disadvantaged farms.
# Ensure food and fiber safety. # Helping family farms.
# Educate producers. # Providing income assistance.
# Conduct basic research.
# Resolve trade problems.
Collins notes that the economic goals are designed to achieve greater efficiency, greater
competitiveness, and to address market failure.  He notes that the most important trends determining
future policy are increasing market orientation and producer responsibility for risk management.
The economic goals listed by Collins are consistent with those enunciated by the Congressional
leadership.  However, the Congressional leadership placed relatively less explicit emphasis on social
goals but, again, we constrained them to five or less.  
Past Policy Goals
Our reference point for policy goals of the past is a 1976 article by Tweeten titled, “Objectives of
U.S. Food and Agricultural Policy and Implications for Commodity Legislation.”  It is interesting to note
that this is one of the few articles found that identifies goals in a manner that has some semblance of the
procedure we used.  However, Tweeten prefaces his goals from the perspective of what farmers
desire.  The producers’ perspective is reached from our interviews only if the Agriculture Committees’2What U.S. farmers desire might not be the same as what Congressional leaders see as the
goals.  However, in a representative governance system, there should be some resemblance.
4
leadership reflects the perspective of farmers.  This may only partially be the case since there are other
relevant groups affecting policy goals.  Tweeten indicates:
“Personal surveys and other sources reveal that U.S. farmers desire:2  
1.  A reasonable or fair economic outcome as measured by the level of returns on
resources, net income or the ratio of prices received to prices paid by farmers.
2. A reasonable or fair stability in economic outcomes, avoiding sharp gyrations
through time.
3. Open access to foreign markets with a minimum of impediments to trade imposed by
other nations or the U.S. Government.
4. Freedom in making production and marketing decisions consistent with major
reliance on pricing and output under market mechanisms of supply and demand that
reward resources to their contribution to the value of output.
5. Environmental protection, including conservation of land and water.
6. Compensation for burdens imposed on farmers by society that are unrewarded by
the market.
7. Preservation of family farm structure.
8. Transfer (welfare) payments to provide a socially acceptable minimum level of living
for farm people who lack resources to earn a decent living through the market5
because of ill health, disability, or other reasons beyond the control of a ‘prudent’
family or individual.”
Tweeten lists eight goals–coincidentally the same number as listed in our interviews.  As one might
expect, Tweeten’s goals are purer in reflecting desired end results, as opposed to means.  However, his
1976 goals reflect substantial differences from those listed by Congressional staff for the next five years. 
Specifically, Tweeten’s 1976 goals reflect: 
1. Substantially greater emphasis on income enhancement.
2. Less emphasis on trade expansion.
3. More emphasis on price stabilization.
4. No emphasis on risk management, except through price stabilization policies.
5. Less emphasis on food safety and security.
6. More emphasis on preservation of family farms.
Subsequently, during the 1996 Farm Bill debate, Tweeten (1995) scrutinized the 12 best reasons for
commodity programs.  While not a look at goals, per se, greater emphasis was placed on economic
efficiency, food security, risk, trade and rural communities.  In so doing, Tweeten reflected substantial
foresight into current issues involving policy goals.
Farm Size
Realizing that the structure of agriculture has resurfaced as a policy concern, the following question
was asked of the congressional respondents, “Is it a high priority that program commodities be
produced on the types of farms they have been over the past five years?”  The following responses
were identified by Congressional Agriculture Committee leaders:6
Frequency Answer
1 Structural change is a consequence of consumer demand, not farm policy.
1 Size of farm is not congressional business.
1 Need to facilitate change in an orderly manner.
1 Need to maintain moderate size farm.
Every office answered this question differently but, except for one respondent, the policy appeared
to be one of allowing change to occur regardless of what happens to size and type of farm.  This may
have resulted from the realization that there is very little that the Congress has done, or can do, about
structural change.
The follow-up question was then asked, “Do you think current programs will retain the current
moderate size, independent farm structure?”  The responses were as follows: 
Frequency Answer
1 No.
1 Other factors dominate structural change.
1 Programs are designed for progressive farmers.
1 Payment limit is counterproductive.
This could be interpreted as a unanimous no.  In a more favorable light, the answers indicate that the
Congressional leadership feels that farm policy has not done, and cannot do, anything about the survival
of moderate-size commercial farms.  Moreover, the goals previously indicated by current policy leaders
suggest that, except in one case, targeting farm size survival is not a top congressional priority–despite
political rhetoric to the contrary. 7
Location of Production
It is well known, although less well documented, that commodity programs have provided more
subsidies to some crops than others (Miller et al; Keough et al; Ernstes, Outlaw and Knutson, March
1997; Ernstes, Outlaw and Knutson, October 1997).  Of particular note are cotton and rice–whose
production is regionally specific.  A contemporary example is soybeans, where the loan rate is high
relative to other commodities.  Production under more market-oriented conditions has the potential for
substantially altering production patterns.  In the 1996 Farm Bill debate, rice and cotton producers
were particularly concerned about the displacement of production from traditional growing areas. 
Therefore, the question was asked, “Is it a high priority that program crops be produced in the same
geographic locations they have been over the past five years?”  The responses follow:
Frequency Answer
3 Government policy should not force change, cannot assure survival and must
assure competitiveness. 
2 Farmers must be free to adjust to market forces and diversify even if it means
getting out of agriculture.
1 While government does not bear the responsibility for past mistakes, changes
need to be accomplished gradually.
  
There was great hesitancy to giving a yes or no answer to this question.  The overall nature of the
responses seemed to be that the government cannot and should not protect farmers who are not
competitive.  The strongest support for maintaining crop production in the current geographic locations
came in the single endorsement supporting gradual adjustment.8
The follow-up question was designed to determine the leaders’ perceptions of what effects the
1996 Farm Bill would have on production patterns:  “Do you think current programs will retain
locations where commodities have been produced over the past five years?”  The responses were:
Frequency Answer
1 Not without supplementals.
1 Perhaps not everywhere.
1 Flexibility facilitates adjustment.
1 Current payments reflect past payments but Congress needs to know if
higher payments are required.
Again, there was reluctance to answer this question yes or no.  There was a recognition that
decoupled payments have already led to shifts in cropping patterns and that, absent the supplementals,
these shifts could accelerate.  The last comment is interesting in that it recognizes that, arguably, those
commodities receiving higher per unit benefits in the past (rice, cotton, peanuts, tobacco) continue to
get them under the 1996 Farm Bill, albeit in a decoupled form.  
Economic Status of Farms
In this section, the economic status of agriculture under the 1996 Farm Bill is evaluated.  This is
done utilizing the AFPC representative crop farms.  These 41 farms are located in major crop
production areas throughout the United States (Figure 1).  In many locations, there are both a moderate
size and a large farm.  Both are contemporary full-time operations with the moderate being
representative of the majority of commercial size operations and the large being 2-3 
times as large although it is typically still an independent family-owned operation.  These representative
crop farms are developed with the assistance of producer panels and are updated by the panel every9
three years.  In the interim, between updates, the size of farm is not changed.  Baseline prices are
developed by the FAPRI Consortium of universities.  The farms are 10




























simulated under conditions of risk utilizing FLIPSIM, a model developed by Richardson and Nixon. 
The 1999 baseline, finalized in January, reflected what turned out to be an optimistic perspective on
Asian recovery and a relatively average perspective on the size of the crop in the Southern Hemisphere. 
The recovery lagged and the global crop was better than average.  Table 1, therefore, contains a
modified baseline for 1999.  In this modified baseline, WASDE July 1999 estimated crop prices are
utilized for 1999.  For 2000, the 1999 WASDE prices were adjusted to reflect the differences between
the 1999 and 2000 harvest month future prices as of mid-July.  The exceptions to this process were
cotton and rice, where TAEX specialists projected forward prices.  From there to 2002, prices are
projected up to the FAPRI 1999 baseline which, based on current crop and global economic
conditions, probably is still optimistic.11
Table 1.  1996-99 Baseline Prices for Years 1996-2002.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Corn ($/bu.)
   JAN ‘96 Baseline
   JAN ‘97 Baseline
   JAN ‘98 Baseline
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*Baseline prices for 1999 were modified to reflect the WASDE July 1999 estimate and, for
2000, the prices were projected using the 1999 WASDE prices adjusted for the difference
between the 1999 and 2000 harvest month futures prices, as of July 12, 1999.12
Table 1 indicates that the crop price outlook has generally deteriorated since 1997 with the big
decline occurring in 1999.  Policies devised for dealing with the adversities for the 1998/99 crop
involved supplemental AMTA payments in addition to the normal AMTA and LDPs
authorized in the 1996 Farm Bill.  Based on current conditions, it is reasonably easy to conclude that
the 1996 Farm Bill could not be enacted today, even though the goals expressed by the Committee
leadership are still consistent with the primary provisions of FAIR.
In this environment of political and economic cross currents, is the 1996 Farm Bill sustainable
through 2002?  To help answer this question, the AFPC representative crop farms were simulated
utilizing the following four scenarios:
# AMTA: The authorized level of AMTA payments in the 1996 Farm Bill, LDPs as authorized,
no disaster payments and no AMTA supplemental/market assistance for 1996-2002. 
# AMTA 98 Sup: The authorized AMTA plus a 49.7 percent AMTA supplemental/market
assistance in 1998 with disaster payments for the 1998 crops received in 1999–no AMTA
supplement in 1999. 
# AMTA Sup: AMTA 98 Sup plus an additional AMTA supplemental in 1999 at the 49.7
percent level, LDPs as authorized and no disaster payments after 1998 (received in 1999).
# AM-Super: AMTA 98 Sup plus an additional 100 percent AMTA supplement in 1999, LDPs
as authorized and no disaster payments after 1998.
The 1999 magnitude of payments under each of these four policy alternatives for each of AFPC’s
representative crop farms is indicated in Table 2.13
Table 2.  Comparison of AMTA and LDP Payments for Representative Farms by Policy Alternatives, 1999.
AMTA AMTA98SUP AMTASUP AM-SUPER




IAG950 15.77 30.81 46.58 15.77 30.81 46.58 23.5 30.81 54.31 31.54 30.81 62.35
IAG2200 38.11 65.92 104.03 38.11 65.92 104.03 56.79 65.92 122.7
1
76.22 65.92 142.14
NEG800 25 21.68 46.68 25 21.68 46.68 37.26 21.68 58.94 50 21.68 71.68





13.86 42.55 56.41 13.86 42.55 56.41 20.66 42.55 63.21 27.73 42.55 70.28
MOCG330
0





8.49 31.29 39.78 8.49 31.29 39.78 12.65 31.29 43.94 16.98 31.29 48.27
TXNP1600 29.88 22.42 52.3 29.88 22.42 52.3 44.52 22.42 66.94 59.76 22.42 82.18





TNG900 6.56 26.92 33.48 6.56 26.92 33.48 9.77 26.92 36.69 13.11 26.92 40.03
TNG2400 31.73 72.02 103.75 31.73 72.02 103.75 47.29 72.02 119.3
1
63.47 72.02 135.49
SCG1500 29.9 52.7 82.6 29.9 52.7 82.6 44.55 52.7 97.25 59.8 52.7 112.5









WAW1500 24.97 23.51 48.48 24.97 23.51 48.48 37.2 23.51 60.71 49.94 23.51 73.45





NDW1760 17.73 20.24 37.97 17.73 20.24 37.97 26.42 20.24 46.66 35.46 20.24 55.7





KSSW1385 20.95 10.95 31.9 20.95 10.95 31.9 31.22 10.95 42.17 41.9 10.95 52.85
KSSW3180 41.29 24.07 65.36 41.29 24.07 65.36 65.51 24.07 85.58 82.57 24.07 106.64
KSNW232
5
20.84 14.02 34.86 20.84 14.02 34.86 31.05 14.02 45.07 41.68 14.02 55.7
KSNW430
0
44.63 27.62 72.25 44.63 27.62 72.25 66.5 27.62 94.12 89.27 27.62 116.89
COW2700 16.85 12.11 28.96 16.85 12.11 28.96 25.11 12.11 37.22 33.7 12.11 45.8114
COW5420 32.52 22.1 54.62 32.52 22.1 54.62 48.46 22.1 70.56 65.05 22.1 87.15
CAC2000 103.05 83.39 186.44 103.05 83.39 186.44 153.53 83.39 236.9
2
206.1 83.39 289.49









TXSP1682 20.66 48.97 69.63 20.66 48.97 69.63 30.78 48.97 79.75 41.32 48.97 90.29









TXRP2500 25.88 24.56 50.44 25.88 24.56 50.44 38.55 24.56 63.11 51.75 24.56 76.31
TXBL1400 18.52 21.28 39.8 18.52 21.28 39.8 27.59 21.28 48.87 37.03 21.28 58.31
TXCB1700 37.71 42.34 80.05 37.71 42.34 80.05 56.18 42.34 98.52 75.42 42.34 117.76
TNC1675 26.06 81.56 107.62 26.06 81.56 107.62 38.82 81.56 120.3
8
52.12 81.56 133.68

































MOR1900 59.13 62.29 121.42 59.13 62.29 121.42 88.11 62.29 150.4 118.2
6
62.29 180.55







ARR2645 59.2 79.86 139.06 59.2 79.86 139.06 88.21 79.86 168.0
7
118.4 79.86 198.26





LAR1100 32.63 35.5 68.13 32.63 35.5 68.13 48.62 35.5 84.12 65.26 35.5 100.7615
AFPC’s experience in working with the Agriculture Committees of the Congress is that they are
most interested in and responsive to the ability of our farms to cash flow.  FLIPSIM expresses this as
the level of net cash farm income as well as the probability of a cash flow deficit. 
Table 3 presents the probability of a cash flow deficit for the AFPC crop farms in 1999 for each
of the four scenarios.  Since the only difference across scenarios is the disaster and market assistance
provided by the Congress, the level of payment is indicative of the change in revenue.  That is, no
difference in farmer supply response is assumed.  
The results indicate that with only AMTA payments as authorized in the 1996 Farm Bill, about 70
percent of the farms (29 of 41) would experience over a 50 percent probability of a cash flow deficit in
1999 (Table 3).  The AMTA supplement in 1998 of approximately 50 percent, with the disaster
payments authorized in 1998 but paid in 1999, reduces the number of farms having over a 50 percent
probability of a cash-flow deficit in 1999 to 28 of 41.  With an AMTA of 49.7 percent in both 1998
and 1999, as well as the disaster payment in 1998 only (AMTA Sup), the number of farms having over
a 50 percent probability of a cash-flow deficit falls to 20 of 41.  With a 100 percent AMTA
supplement in 1999 (AM-Super) in Table 3, the number of farms having over a 50 percent probability
of a cash-flow deficit is reduced to 15 of 41.
These results suggest substantial political pressure to double the level of AMTA payments. 
Moreover, the current economic forecasts for years 2000-2002 suggest that this level of supplemental
payments may be necessary through 2002.
Traditionally, concerns about payment limits have been largely a Southern phenomena and these
farms have generally been restructured so that these constraints have not been as binding.  16
Table 3. Probability of a Cash Flow Deficit in 1999 for








IAG950 59 59 52 47
IAG2200 53 53 48 44
NEG800 95 95 94 94
NEG1575 72 72 65 57
MOCG1700 38 38 28 23
MOCG3300 45 45 43 34
MONG1200 91 91 88 88
TXNP1600 56 55 38 32
TXNP5500 36 34 30 26
TNG900 83 80 77 71
TNG2400 43 43 39 35
SCG1500 62 48 43 39
SCG3500 37 28 21 16
WAW1500 79 79 69 66
WAW4250 63 63 58 53
NDW1760 51 51 40 33
NDW4850 56 56 49 43
KSSW1385 60 58 40 26
KSSW3180 20 20 11   6
KSNW2325 84 84 83 79
KSNW4300 74 74 64 55
COW2700 54 54 43 30
COW5420 46 46 37 30
CAC2000 58 58 50 38
CAC6000 39 39 37 30
TXSP1682 79 53 48 42
TXSP3697 21   3   1   1
TXRP2500 76 75 70 65
TXBL1400 43 37 30 23
TXCB1700 99 97 95 92
TNC1675 70 70 66 58
TNC3800 79 79 73 69
CAR424 98 98 80 40
CAR1365 96 96 73 34
TXR2118 75 75 33 16
TXR3750 84 84 51 23
MOR1900 99 99 99 96
MOR4000 92 89 85 7517
ARR2645 40 40 24 13
ARR3400 39 39 18   9
LAR1100 97 97 91 7918
In 1998, however, payment limits became binding on a larger share of Midwest farms as well as on
Southern farms that were not prepared for increased LDPs, especially for soybeans.  
Table 2 indicates that with a 100 percent 1999 AMTA supplement, 19 of the 41 farms would be
over the $40,000 additional supplemental payment limit for a single entity/person ($80,000 total), which
is generally the most binding.  When considering both AMTA and LDP payment limits, 21 of the 41
farms exceed the limit if structured as a single “person.”  AFPC studies have indicated that farmers
having exceeded their payment limits in commodities such as cotton and rice had successfully
restructured their operations to avoid this constraint.  The easiest method of restructuring involves the
inclusion of the farmer’s spouse as a “person” in the operation.  However, with good legal counsel,
there appears to be very little constraint on the ability of a farmer to legally restructure to enhance the
payment limit.
In 1998, our analyses indicates that a number of farmers who had not previously confronted the
payment limit found that they left subsidies on the table.  Most of these farmers who had not
restructured were located in the Midwest where payment limits had not previously been a constraint. 
Interestingly, Midwest interests have been traditional supporters of payment limits.  In 1999, there will
be another test of the support for the relatively low current limits, at a time when a larger number of
Midwest farmers are adversely affected by them.  Raising the limits or eliminating them could now get
bipartisan support.  
A final question asked of Congressional leadership involved the sustainability of annual transition
supplementals.  Specifically, “Are ad-hoc market assistance/disaster payments a viable approach to get
farmers through the next five years and at other times as the need arises?”  The responses follow:19
Frequency Answer
1 Yes, through 2002 but it will be ugly.
1 Yes, as long as budget surpluses exist.
1 Yes, but the answer may be different after
redistricting in 2002.
1 Yes, but not every year.
All answers were a qualified yes to the sustainability of the 1996 Farm Bill through at least 2002. 
Some would interpret these answers as an endorsement of the FAIR transition payment concept in that
it provided the flexibility for supplementals.  Others would suggest that this flexibility is not unique to
FAIR.  It has always existed and has been exercised when needed for either economic or political
reasons.  Interim “fix it” farm bills have been common whenever agriculture goes on the rocks. 
Conclusions
The goals of policy have changed with FAIR, but the ability of farmers to command high levels of
spending in times of need is still present.  Congressional leadership generally supports the goals and
philosophy that underlies FAIR, despite the “crisis” that confronts many farmers.  The type of support,
however, has changed to a combination of decoupled AMTA payments, coupled LDP payments, and
ad-hoc supplementals for years of adverse yields and/or prices.  High payments are possible in years of
budget surpluses with rural and urban horse-trading on tax and spending issues.  Annual appropriations
for decoupled payments would be more difficult if there were budget deficits.  Payment limits could be
a more important issue than they have been in the past because limits are now binding on a cross
section of farms for all major commodities and geographic regions.20
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